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THE INSURER AS THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST
IRVING P. ANDREWS
of the Denver Bar

A client comes to your office the victim, let us say, of an automobile collision in which he has suffered personal injuries, loss
of wages, agonizing pain, and property damage. After relating
the details' surrounding the accident, the first question you'll
probably ask is whether or not the prospective defendant has
insurance. Assuming an affirmative answer is given to this inquiry, you proceed to advise your client that, notwithstanding the
existence of insurance, unless a favorable settlement can be obtained from the insurance carrier, the matter of recovery must
be presented to a court and determined by a jury wherein the question of insurance coverage cannot be affirmatively disclosed. A
quizzical look clouds your client's face, and he answers that unless
the fact of insurance is disclosed, any verdict he would receive
would not reflect that the insurance company is the real adversary,
to the exclusion of the thoughtless defendant who "ran" the inevitable red light. Thus begins the hopeless and ungratifying
effort to explain to your client the "hide and go seek" method
that presently prevails throughout the majority of the jurisdictions in the trial of negligence cases where the question of insurance coverage beclouds the problem.
The present status of the law permits parties litigant to exalt
form over substance. On voir dire examination it is permissible
to ask questions as to whether or not the prospective juror is a
director, stockholder, employee, or is in any manner interested

in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against
liability for damages for injuries to persons or property. Or a
more specific question may be asked in which a particular insurance company is named. Both questions as to form have been
approved as proper on voir dire examination.' The Supreme Court
of Colorado has approved the use of the specific question 2 and
has not limited the scope of inquiry as to the matter of insurance
3
in the form of questions on voir dire examination. Thus in the
case of John's v. Shinall 4 the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
It is permissible to interrogate prospective jurors,
some of whom may be selected to serve in the case, as to
their connection with or interest in insurance companies,
and we have held that questions touching this matter may
be asked of every prospective juror.
156 A.L.R. 1456 and 104 A.L.R. 1067.
'Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v. Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 498 (1906).
2Ibid.
I John's v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 86 P. 2d 605 (1939).

DICTA

April, 1952

It is permissible, and rightly so, that each of twelve
prospective jurors in a case be asked on voir dire examination whether he is a stockholder, agent, or employee
of an insurance company.
Here under the prevailing rules of procedure and controlling
decisions, the "insurance question" is introduced into the trial
by sly innuendo and indirection. With modern society, insurance
has become a necessity to the home owner and automobile driver.
The fact of insurance is notorious, not only to lawyers and judges,
but to juries as well. Whether by specifically naming a particular
insurance company or by general inquiry as to insurance, the
jury is made aware that, notwithstanding the machinations of
both court and counsel, some insurance company has a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation. Insurance companies
generally, desire to avoid prosecuting actions in their own names
we are told, because of the prejudicial effect disclosure of their
identity and interest has upon the jury. It is a common and
ordinary occurrence in the typical indemnity suit to find that
both parties are insured, that the insurance carrier has provided
both parties with counsel, and that the action is being conducted
by the insurers. The realities of the controversy are thus hidden
from the jury. The casualty company that is really defending
or prosecuting the suit is immune from such disclosure and mention of the fact results in mistrial. In Butera v. Donner 5 a New
York court said:
"It is highly incongruous to observe the courts upon
one hand guarding with direst of sanctions against the
injection into a casualty case of the fact, even the suggestion, of liability insurance covering the defendant, and
on the other hand welcoming with warm hospitality the
injection into a casualty case of the fact of collision insurance covering the plaintiff. In both instances, the
insurer is the real party in interest; it selects and retains
counsel, controls the case and profits or loses by the outcome."
The New York court, cited supra, stated without unnecessary
quibbling what every intelligent juror can be presumed to know.
Disclosure of the fact of insurance is believed to arouse prejudice
and consequently result in a denial of a fair and impartial trial.
Under the guise of questioning propounded for the purpose of
determining the bias, interest, or prejudice of a juror, the insurance question is insinuated into the trial and left dangling at the
conclusion of the voir dire without further mention unless counsel
for both sides inform the jurors that these questions are being
asked to determine their fitness to serve as jurors in the trial.
If the insurance question is belabored by detailed explanation,
I Butera v. Donner, 177 Misc. 966, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (1942).
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the basic reason and purpose for its exclusion is circumvented,
and the question of insurance is squarely brought before the jury.
By now your client complains that all this legalistic hairsplitting is utterly incomprehensible. He informs you that all
you have said thus far is that you can and you cannot inform
the jury that the defendant does or does not have insurance. To
pacify him you'll probably explain to him that there have been
numerous proposals to remedy the situation. The first alternative
being to exclude all references to insurance either by a general
or specific inquiry, or as a second alternative a full disclosure
should be made of the insurance carriers interest, or as a third
alternative he or any injured party should by statute be authorized to bring the action directly against the insurance carrier
without being forced first to obtain a judgment against the insured, which is the prevailing policy in some jurisdictions that
are attempting to restore order in this area of the law where
opinions run hot and fast. One illustration of the trend to relieve
the injured party of the burden of maintaining an imaginary law
suit is found in Chapter 155, General Laws of Rhode Island, Section 258, which provides as follows:
Every policy hereafter written insuring against liability for property damage or personal injuries or both,
and every policy hereinafter written indemnifying any
person by reason of such liability, other than payment of
compensation under Chapter 300, shall contain provisions
to the effect that the insurer shall be directly liable to the
injured -party and, in the event of his death, to the party
entitled to sue therefor, to pay him the amount of damages for which such insured is liable. Such insured party,
or, in the event of his death the party entitled to sue
therefor, in his suit against the insured, shall not join
the insurer as defendant. If however, the officer serving
any process against the insured shall return said process
"non est inventus," the said injured party and in the
event of his death, the party entitled to sue therefor, may
proceed directly against the insurer. Said injured party,
or, in the event of his death the party entitled to sue
therefor after having obtained judgment against the insured alone, may proceed on said judgment in a separate
action against the insurer: Provided, however, that the
payment in whole or in part of such liability by either
the insured or the insurer shall, to the extent thereof,
be a bar to recovery against the other of the amount so
paid.
All policies described in this section shall be deemed
to be made subject to the provisions hereof, and all provisions of such policies inconsistant herewith shall be
void.
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Decisions construing the statute set out above indicate that
the legislative policy is to give neither side of the controversy
an unfair advantage and to provide for direct action against the
insurance carrier only when certain conditions precedent occur.
In Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America,6 the Rhode Island court said:
The insurer cannot be joined in any action against
the insured, and only when the insured cannot be served
with process may this action be brought directly against
the insurer. The insurer's liability is in the nature of a
surety whose obligation is limited to the contractual obligation under the insurance policy.
To further safeguard the insurer in an action brought directly
against it, the plaintiff must establish his case exactly as though
the insured was the defendant, and every defense available to
7
the insured is available to the insurer.
While the Rhode Island statute requires the "non est" return
as a prior condition to bringing a direct action against the insurance carrier, direct action is allowed.
Judicial decisions and present rules of procedure, you explain
to your client, mark a great advance over the common law and
the code yet much remains to be desired. Finally, as your client
succumbs to the tedium of your remarks, you inform him that
the real party in interest in any negligence and casualty case
remains the hidden foe beyond the pale of the real party in interest
statutes, and with a final rhetorical flourish you ask him, is legislation the answer?

THE SELLER OF ONE MINK COAT v.
PVT. JOHNNIE DOE
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
of the Denver Bar, Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of La6v

Judgment for whom in the above designated action? '35 C.S.A.
Ch. 83 Sec. 10 provides as follows:
The expenses of the family and the education of the
children are chargeable upon the property of both husband
and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately.
The language in the decisions under the statute seems to
leave no doubt that Johnnie would be liable for the purchase as a
"family expense" if his wife bought and wore the coat herself
during a time when they were living together.' But the Supreme
6Luft v. Factory Mut. Liability Insurance Co., 51 R.I. 452, 155 A. 797.
'Ibid.
IGilman v. Mathews, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 P. 366; Houck v. La Junta Hardware Co., 50 Colo. 228, 114 P. 645; Straight v. McKay, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60
P. 1106.

